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Abstract 
Autonomous systems with cognitive features are on their way 
into the market. Within complex environments, they promise 
to implement complex and goal oriented behavior even in a 
safety related context. This behavior is based on a certain 
level of situational awareness (perception) and advanced de-
cision making (deliberation). These systems in many cases 
are driven by artificial intelligence (e.g. neural networks). 
The problem with such complex systems and with using AI 
technology is that there is no generally accepted approach to 
ensure trustworthiness. This paper presents a framework to 
exactly fill this gap. It proposes a reference lifecycle as a 
structured approach that is based on current safety standards 
and enhanced to meet the requirements of autonomous/cog-
nitive systems and trustworthiness. 
Introduction 
Autonomous/cognitive systems are taking over safety-
relevant tasks in many industries, for example in the medi-
cal, the automotive, or the aviation industry. Their usage ex-
tends beyond limited operational environment into highly 
complex one, where engineered functions operate autono-
mously. This resulted in a term, recently used quite exten-
sively, autonomous systems. These autonomous/cognitive 
systems (A/C-system), as they are called in this work, due 
to the high criticality of functions that they implement, need 
some form of qualification or even certification before being 
approved for the market. However, even in cases where a 
formal certification is not legally required, national and in-
ternational standards provide guidelines and best practices 
that aim at minimizing unacceptable risks for bringing prod-
ucts to market. There are many standards as such. They ei-
ther object on disjoint aspects of system development, com-
plementing one another, or significantly overlap, presenting 
however different strategies to reach desired goals. An ex-
ample of the last this could be trustworthy system design. 
Standard IEC 61508 [Commission (2010)] is a generic 
standard to address functional safety of electric, electronic 
and programmable elements for all industries. It looks at 
risks that evolve from malfunctioning and does not cover the 
intended performance. In IEC 61508 the underlying ap-
proach is to enable qualification by providing a safety case 
together with the product. To generate the safety case, which 
is a structured argumentation, IEC 61508 defines a struc-
tured approach called safety lifecycle. 
An adaptation of this standard for the Automotive Indus-
try is the ISO 26262 [ISO (2011)] which addresses func-
tional safety of electric, electronic and programmable ele-
ments and these risks that evolve from malfunctioning. 
Complementary to this is ISO/PAS 21448 [ISO (2019)] 
which is also targeting road vehicles. It is focused around 
the absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards resulting 
from functional insufficiencies (performance) of the in-
tended functionality or by reasonably foreseeable misuse by 
persons. These are referred to as the Safety Of The Intended 
Functionality (SOTIF). 
This paper argues that these standards do not sufficiently 
cover the aspects of A/C-systems. First shortage is due to 
the important property of the A/C-systems which is interac-
tive behavior with a complex environment. This interaction 
needs to account for constantly changing surrounding con-
ditions, and consider scenarios that were not even envi-
sioned when the system was designed. This paper argues on 
the need of a new phase in the overall system design lifecy-
cle, which would encompass this concern. 
The second deficiency is due to the potential usage of AI 
technology to implement autonomous behavior of A/C-sys-
tems. NNs which are the main exponent of AI technology 
represent a promising approach to cope with the complexity 
of these future systems, creating at the same time new de-
mands. While progress in AI is accelerating, standardization 
efforts for safety-critical systems are not keeping up. For ex-
ample, ISO 26262 (“Road vehicles – Functional safety”) 
does not define how AI can be safely applied in its domain. 
This even holds for the updated version that is currently un-
der revision. Yet, industry and academia is researching and 
developing self-driving cars – of course using AI technol-
ogy. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a structured meth-
odology that ensures a sufficient quality level when devel-
oping systems involving AI. 
Considering above shortages in current state of the art, the 
main goal of this work is to develop a structured approach, 
here called reference lifecycle, which ensures a sufficient 
quality level. The last states core part of the evolving 
DKE/AK 801.0.8 standard [DKE (2019)], focused on the 
specification of trustworthy A/C-systems. The main crite-
rion for concepts introduced here is their flexibility, so that 
it is possible to integrate them into multiple different exist-
ing (safety) standards. It is believed that such an approach 
can increase chances for an acceptance of these new con-
cepts by the industry and therefore lead to a faster publica-
tion of the new standard. 
This work is structured in a following way: Next section 
presents related work, focusing on the safety aspect (a cru-
cial ingredient of trustworthiness concept defined in this pa-
per) of complex systems, and the problem of their qualifica-
tion within engineering approach. Section Key Concepts de-
fines key concepts used throughout the entire paper. Follow-
ing section discusses the main idea which is a reference 
lifecycle and overall structured methodology to develop 
trustworthy A/C-systems. Finally, the last section concludes 
this paper and discusses next steps towards a complete spec-
ification of the structured approach. 
Related Work 
Engineering of trustworthy A/C-systems introduces new 
set of problems and challenges which mostly result from the 
open environment in which these systems operate. Closed 
environment is an implicit assumption within currently ex-
isting standards such as [Commission (2010)], [ISO (2011)] 
and [ISO (2019)]. They all shape an engineering approach 
towards development of safety-critical systems, but without 
explicit consideration of autonomous and cognitive behav-
ior. This has resulted in attempts to implicitly use such 
standards, referring mainly to their possible connections 
with AI, which is widely researched as a technology to im-
plement A/C-systems. Relatively recent works try to reason 
about a safety of AI based solutions by referring into the 
mentioned standards. Work from [Rick Salay (2018)] iden-
tifies 34 methods related to unit development in ISO 26262 
[ISO (2011)] part 6 (i.e. part related to Software develop-
ment) where 27 of them are highly recommended for 
ASIL D (Automotive Safety Integrity Level – level of criti-
cality, where D represents the highest level). Authors show 
that most of these methods could be applied to machine 
learning hence increasing its reliability. For example, initial-
ization of variables. However, 7 of these methods require 
adaptation, e.g. semi-formal notations. Henriksson et al. 
[Henriksson (2018)] shows how to proceed with such adap-
tations. [Gosavi and Conrad (2018)] is also attempting to ex-
tract methods from ISO 26262 which could be used, so that 
safety can be introduced in autonomous and semi-autono-
mous vehicles. Common thing among these works is that 
they all strive to use the standard as it is and see how existing 
techniques, coined mainly for improving safety of Software 
(SW), could be reused with slight adaptations, if necessary.  
Traditionally, it was considered best practice, not to uti-
lize AI (especially machine learning) for safety-relevant 
tasks. For example, Bergmiller’s work on functional safety 
in drive-by-wire vehicles states that neural networks are un-
suitable for such a system [Bergmiller (2015)]. He cites 
mainly their lack of interpretability and states that their 
downsides apply to most other machine learning techniques 
as well. 
Kurd et al. [Kurd, Kelly, and Austin (2006)] propose a path 
towards certifying neural networks for safety-relevant sys-
tems. They propose hybrid networks where symbolic 
knowledge is inserted into a neural network and after the 
learning process, refined symbolic knowledge is extracted. 
This approach avoids the black-box view of traditional neu-
ral networks at the cost of having to solve the additional 
problem of extracting knowledge from the network. The lat-
ter is known to be NP-hard. Furthermore, Kurd et al. dis-
cusses safety criteria of neural networks and present them in 
the form of goal structuring notation. Importantly, authors 
present also a safety lifecycle to be applied at the technology 
level, based on the ‘W’ model, as they call it. It is reasoning 
about concerns which result from the usage of hybrid net-
works. For example, one of the steps in the lifecycle of Kurd 
et al. is called Initial knowledge where initial knowledge is 
converted into symbolic forms. Framework proposed in this 
work does not collide with the ‘W’ model. In fact, approach 
of Kurd et al. could be easily integrated into framework pre-
sented in this work through so called concept of a blueprint, 
explained later in this work. Kurd’s PhD thesis [Kurd 
(2005)] contains a more detailed discussion as well as a sur-
vey on neural networks in safety critical systems. 
Another proposal towards certifiable neural networks 
comes from Morgan et al. [Morgan et al.(1996)]. The differ-
ence is that their approach heavily focuses on certifying the 
process of training the network instead of certifying the net-
work itself. They also raise a set of questions and guidelines 
that a corresponding standard should answer. Rodvold 
[Rodvold (1999)] proposes a different development process 
for neural networks that resembles the waterfall model of 
traditional software development. 
Pulina and Tacchella [Pulina and Tacchella (2010)] present 
an approach, where a neural network is modelled via Bool-
ean combinations of linear arithmetic constraints in such a 
way, that the constraints are consistent if and only if the net-
work is safe. Therefore, deciding the safety of the neural net-
work can be answered by finding a satisfying assignment for 
the constraints.  
What is characteristic about all these works, is that they 
are focusing on one, very particular issue, i.e. employment 
of AI, especially NNs, in the context of safety critical sys-
tems. Even if some of them explicitly refer to standards 
which define structured approach, their reasoning is re-
stricted to the level of AI introduction. They don’t consider 
the problem from the broader perspective, i.e. how A/C-sys-
tems design could influence all the levels of an engineering 
approach, not just the level of a specific technology, i.e. AI, 
SW or HW technology. 
Key Concepts 
Structured approach to dependable cognitive systems and 
dependable AI applications discussed in this work is based 
on several key concepts. They are described in this section 
and will be referenced by the description of the trustworthi-
ness reference lifecycle presented in the follow-up section. 
Autonomous/Cognitive System 
The term autonomous/cognitive system is used as an ab-
straction from AI or NNs, to focus on functionality and be-
havior. With this term, the overall system is addressed, not 
only the algorithms as the core of behavior generation. Ac-
tually, NNs or more broadly, AI algorithms, might be part 
of a cognitive system but are no precondition as long as the 
systems shows autonomous/cognitive behavior. This means 
that on the technical level, it is left to the people to decide if 
standard SW/HW processes are enough or there exist special 
needs that one could deliver only with AI method. Another 
term that was introduced, and which similarly as A/C-sys-
tems describe systems that bear behavior, one would nor-
mally associate with human behavior in terms of complex-
ity, these are open context systems [Burton, Gauerhof, and 
Heinzemann (2017)]. During the design the capabilities and 
skills to generate the behavior of an A/C-system should be 
derived from the task share with the user and from the inter-
action with other entities in the environment. These defini-
tions form a separate and early design phase in a design pro-
cess of cognitive systems. 
The behavior of a cognitive system is defined by the in-
puts and outputs of the system. For an illustration refer to 
Figure 1; here the cognitive system is represented as ovals 
on the right (the so called body of the cognitive system) in 
opposite to the world or environment where the user can be 
found. The environment and the A/C-system are connected 
via inputs and outputs. Between these input and output ar-
rows, the behavior can be measured (Behaviour arrow). The 
behavior is conceptually a function taking the input and gen-
erating the output, considering also the internal state of the 
cognitive system. 
The behavior generating function is decomposed into 
three subfunctions (the so-called knowledge transforma-
tors): Perception, Deliberation and Execution – which is 
similar to the decomposition paradigm of “sense-plan-act” 
in the robotics domain. These subfunctions are further de-
tailed into skills. For example, the perception could be struc-
tured along skills of “multi sensor data fusion”, “object de-
tection”, “object classification” and “intent recognition”. 
The body of the cognitive system is structured into the a-
priori-knowledge (inner and darker oval in Figure 1) and sit-
uational knowledge (outer oval). The a priori knowledge is 
generated by the knowledge transformators using their a-
priori knowledge during runtime. This can be understood 
like an instantiation process of the concepts within the a-
priori knowledge. To do this, each transformator “reads” 
primarily in its input area (but may use the whole 
knowledge) and writes into the output area. So, the Percep-
tion reads primarily from “in” and writes to “Context 
Model” which describes the analyzed situation the system is 
in. This might include a representation of objects in the en-
vironment but also might comprise of abstract objects like 
distances or threads. The Deliberation takes the Context 
Model and determines what to do and how. A (structured) 
action plan is the result of the Deliberation. Last but not least 
the Execution takes the Action Plan as primary input, selects 
current actions, takes priorities into account and writes com-
mands to the out area. The commands in the out area are 
taken and processed by the output to drive actuators and to 
manipulate the environment. This model of a cognitive sys-
tem represents working model and functional abstraction for 
structured approach (trustworthiness reference lifecycle) 
discussed in this work.  
An A/C-system might include a subset of the following 
characteristics: 
• recognizes its environment (or parts of it) through “sen-
sors”, 
• knows about the intentions of elements in its environ-
ments (e.g. implements intent recognition), 
• knows about higher level goals (might even incorporate 
ethical point of views), 
• takes (non-trivial) decisions based on reasoning, 
• influences its environment via actuators (distinguish from 
actor in the sense of performer), 
• interacts and cooperates with the elements of its environ-
ment, 
Figure 1: Cognitive Process 
• influences elements in its environment to better meet its 
own goals (e.g. mechanism design), 
• shows a certain behavior based on skills, and 
• learns even new behavior during runtime. 
Examples for A/C-systems are Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems, Automated vehicles or Autonomous Robots. 
Trustworthiness and its Analysis 
The term trustworthiness has no generally accepted defi-
nition. This work considers trustworthiness as a more ge-
neric concept that combines a user defined and potentially 
project specific set of aspects. These aspects include but are 
not limited to (functional) safety, security, privacy, usabil-
ity, ethical and legal compliance, reliability, availability, 
maintainability, and (intended) functionality (see Figure 2).  
These non-functional properties, forming trustworthiness 
concept, are brought into the system by applying certain 
methods and by the way in which the original functional re-
quirements are implemented. Therefore these characteristics 
(non-functional properties) are called “emerging”, i.e. not 
directly implementable. They need to be built into the prod-
uct during design time. Furthermore, these characteristics 
need to be proven on the basis of process documentation, the 
use and implementation of suitable methods and measures 
and finally, by the capability of the designers. In order to 
address these issues, a structured process needs to be fol-
lowed throughout the whole design cycle of an A/C-system 
(see Section – Reference Lifecycle), including the compo-
nents that contain NNs or other AI algorithms. 
Another challenge is to balance between all potentially 
conflicting aspects. For example, safety and security might 
support or exclude each other. And traditionally, aspects of 
security and usability do conflict. These need to be resolved 
and balanced decisions need to be taken. 
Implementing a trustworthy system of interest follows the 
well-known approach along the reference lifecycle of the 
following steps: 
• analyze (trustworthiness) hazards and assess (trustworthi-
ness) risks 
• define a (trustworthiness) concept consisting of (trustwor-
thiness) mitigation measures 
• implement (trustworthiness) concept 
In every step of a lifecycle, trustworthiness is considered 
with the same set of aspects (and scopes). During the trust-
worthiness analysis, special care has to be taken by combin-
ing its aspects (safety, security, etc.), especially when hazard 
attributes like integrity and assurance are combined or when 
combining aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. During the 
implementation phases this is less relevant. There the spe-
cific performance of the implemented element is the rele-
vant issue. It relates to integrity/assurance/uncertainties 
trough traceability, but these are no direct input during e.g. 
the implementation of a software unit. To reflect this obser-
vation the reference lifecycle takes into account “Trustwor-
thiness Performance Level” (TPL) as a one-dimensional 
performance attribute of trustworthiness requirements. 
Reference Lifecycle 
This section presents an approach towards trustworthy 
A/C-systems. The backbone of this approach is a system 
lifecycle discussed in this section which is the core of further 
contributions such as addition of the Solution Level, and 
concerns related to AI in a form of AI Design and AI Blue-
print concepts. 
Overview 
An assurance case is a convincing and structured argu-
mentation based on evidences that the A/C-system is suffi-
ciently trustworthy. Trustworthiness with every aspect like 
safety, security etc. (see Figure 2) is an emergent property 
of a system of interest. It emerges from all activities during 
the engineering phase. So the structured argument that trust-
worthiness is met needs to be based on a structured approach 
of the engineering phase, which motivates this work. One of 
the main problems that prevents A/C-systems from being 
qualifyable, is an unstructured and ad-hoc way of develop-
ing them, especially components that contain AI technol-
ogy. These have negative impact on the ability to compile a 
structured argument of trustworthiness based on evidences. 
While for classical software and hardware, process models 
that ensure certain level of rigor have been developed , these 
are not directly applicable to AI specific systems. This mo-
tivates a definition of a structured lifecycle which accounts 
also for AI concerns. 
The reference lifecycle discussed in this work covers the 
Design part of the overall product lifecycle (see Figure 3). 
Figure 2: Aspects forming the metaterm "Trustworthiness" Figure 3: Product Lifecycle 
Figure 4 presents the reference lifecycle. The name, refer-
ence lifecycle, signifies its main purpose, i.e. it can be used 
as a reference for a standard that supports assessment ap-
proach for trustworthy systems. It is inspired by and resem-
bles to certain degree the structure of the safety lifecycle in 
IEC 61508 and similarly in ISO 26262. However, this ap-
proach is not restricted to it and can be adapted to other 
standards like IEC 61508, ISO/IEC 15504 (Software Pro-
cess Improvement and Capability, SPICE) [ISO/IEC 
(2008b)], and ISO/IEC 12207 (Systems and Software Engi-
neering – Software lifecycle processes) [ISO/IEC (2008a)]. 
Apart from the process structure, this framework absorbs 
also the ISO 26262-like safety argumentation based on the 
integrity principle 
The reference lifecycle is a phase model that arranges 
concepts (e.g. Initiation) into logical dependency sequence. 
The reference lifecycle is not a process model. The phases 
are not to be understood as a waterfall model. The reference 
lifecycle defines the logical flow of activities but is open to 
any actual process model (e.g. waterfall, V model, spiral 
model). This flow of activities grouped in phases of the ref-
erence lifecycle lead to the design and implementation of the 
solution accompanied by its trustworthiness assurance case. 
Starting from the top, first is Initiation phase, which ob-
jects in finding the solution that shall be developed. At that 
stage, interfaces, environment and usage of the solution and 
last but not least, requirements concerning trustworthiness 
shall be understood. Also, synchronization with organiza-
tion and process framework shall be executed, and finally, 
competent team to work on different aspects of the product 
shall be setup. Concerning principia of this phase, it can be 
related to the Item definition and Initiation of the safety 
lifecycle phases, as defined in ISO 26262. 
Next, development at Solution Level expresses one of the 
contributions of the overall lifecycle, hence it is described in 
more details in a separate section. 
Development at System Level is also characteristic to 
other standards, listed before, with an exception that the in-
put to that phase in proposed reference lifecycle comes from 
the Solution Level, which is not present in most other stand-
ards. From that standpoint, system level as defined here has 
additional, unique characteristics, which are discussed more 
broadly in section – System Level. 
Activities of the Technology Level are focused on con-
tributing to the solution, based on a certain type of technol-
ogy. Here, refinement of trustworthiness concept into spe-
cific technology that will implement it, takes place. For 
hardware and software this lifecycle refers to the corre-
sponding, well defined and described activities, specified in 
existing standards. For instance, ISO 26262 part 5 thor-
oughly describes development at hardware level, and corre-
spondingly, part 6 does the same for software. Contribution 
of the trustworthiness lifecycle is that it puts into considera-
tion AI, and hence introduces two concepts at this phase, i.e. 
AI Design and AI Blueprint. These are discussed in more 
details, correspondingly in section AI Development and AI 
Blueprint. 
The IV&V of the System refers to the concerns of design 
verification and validation especially in terms of its compli-
ance and completeness with regards to the technical trust-
worthiness concept. This implies usage of such methods as 
system design inspection, walkthrough, simulation, and 
from the trustworthiness perspective, this is trustworthiness 
analysis. The similar purpose as of the previous phase, 
guides activities identified for the IV&V of the Solution. 
Namely, solution is inspected to verify and validate its com-
pliance and completeness in regards to functional and trust-
worthiness requirements. 
Next phase, i.e. Acceptance and Release covers several 
objectives. This is preparation of the release documentation 
which specifies, inter alia, criteria for the release for produc-
tion. Next, this is compilation of a trustworthiness assurance 
case, i.e. how, over the reference lifecycle, trustworthiness 
objectives were reached. This requires to deeply and thor-
oughly assess the trustworthiness of the solution concept. 
Ultimate objective is to release the solution for production. 
Last step, with tight correspondences to existing stand-
ards, concerns market surveillance and CAPA (Corrective 
Action Preventive Action). These are all activities which fo-
cus on the monitoring of a product in its operational envi-
ronment and necessary reactions to possible malfunctioning 
and dissatisfaction of end users resulting from it.  
Solution Level 
An A/C-system is more than an algorithm that is catego-
rized as artificial intelligence and that is implemented in one 
or more elements of the A/C-system. To understand the full 
Figure 4: Reference Lifecycle 
complexity it is necessary to take the user of the A/C-system 
into account as well as all relevant interfaces and elements 
in the environment. Actually this is the level of abstraction 
that is called the solution level. The solution level delineates 
the whole setting that can be perceived as an architecture in 
which the A/C-system is one element. 
The intent of the Solution Level is to generate a solution 
concept on the basis of all customer requirements which 
might - in the first place - include conflicts. Resolving con-
flicts and including the use and environment of the product 
results in a consistent solution concept. Furthermore the so-
lution level is the relevant origin of all hazards, because in 
most cases hazards do not arise from a system of interest 
itself but from setting the system into an environment. 
The definition of the solution concept refers to a black 
box model and a white box model: 
• The black box model focuses on the interfaces, the be-
havior (including interaction and cooperation of the A/C-
system with other elements in the solution) and further 
requirements of the A/C-system. One of the crucial ele-
ments of this black box model is to define the task share 
between the A/C-system, the user and other elements. A 
typical black box model is the sociotechnical work sys-
tem. 
• The white box model takes a look into the A/C-system as 
an element of the solution level architecture. At this phase 
of the development the description is kept at a very ab-
stract level and remains functional in most cases. The pur-
pose of the white box model is to better understand the 
behavioral elements of the A/C-system. For this purpose 
the behavior defined using the black box model is detailed 
to skills of the A/C-system describing the mechanisms of 
the recognize-act-cycle as the closed loop between envi-
ronment and A/C-system. An example for a white box 
model is the generic sense-plan-act model. 
At this level the development team shall review the cus-
tomer requirements, and all other relevant material to under-
stand the scope and goals of the solution. Then, the team 
shall describe the overall solution using the defined nota-
tion. This description includes the goals (e.g. in terms of use 
cases) of the development, the environment and its relevant 
elements including the user, the interfaces of the system to 
all relevant elements in the environment, and the boundaries 
of the system. 
Next, the same team needs to define the black box model 
to describe the observable behavior of the system – item. 
This description should cover all relevant aspects of the in-
teraction and cooperation within the solution. It also needs 
to define the black box behavior (input-output-mapping that 
can be observed), and allocate behavioral requirements to 
other elements in the solution. This black box model shall 
be then used to describe the interaction and cooperation con-
cept. This includes description of overall tasks of the solu-
tion, task share between item and other elements of the so-
lution (user or machine, etc.), interaction and cooperation 
with other elements, definition of the black box behavior of 
the item (input-output-mapping that can be observed), and 
allocation of behavioral requirements to other elements in 
the solution. 
Following is the specification of the solution behavior, 
described as functional chains and including necessary skills 
in the machine. This is the mentioned white box model. 
Such a description shall include functional architecture as a 
partition of the behavior (recognize-act-cycle), cognitive 
theory on how to generate behavior (= mapping between in-
put and output), and cognitive architecture description. 
The development team shall then use the white box model 
to describe the internal processes of the system. This de-
scription shall include functional architecture of the system, 
definition of elements according to the white box model 
(e.g. behavior & skills of the system), definition of inter-
faces between these elements, and collaboration of these el-
ements via the given interfaces to generate behavior. 
Ultimate outcome of the activities performed at the solu-
tion level should include solution definition, cooperation 
concept, functional architecture of the system, and ac-
ceptance criteria for cooperation and behavior. The last is 
required aspect of trustworthiness concept. 
System Level 
The development at system level is the link between the 
definition of the solution (solution level) and the implemen-
tation according to a certain technology (technology level). 
In the first place there are no trustworthiness specific char-
acteristics or activities. These systems engineering activities 
can be organized according to typical systems engineering 
standards (e.g. ISO/IEC 15288). The people in charge of the 
development at system level should care for a good design 
and the application of organizational, proven and state-of-
the-art processes, supporting processes, architectures, meth-
ods and measures. 
Taking a detailed look at the system level, the awareness 
of trustworthiness induces at least two aspects that are rele-
vant to achieving trustworthiness in the resulting A/C-sys-
tem and solution:  
• repetitive / iterative application of that part of the standard 
to cover the complexity of system-of-systems as well as 
complex system architectures 
• traceability of trustworthiness attributes throughout all 
levels of the design hierarchy, including methods like al-
location, decomposition and segregation 
• compilation of the trustworthy assurance case, and 
• design patterns that support verification and AI properties 
The hierarchical design will be very specific to the A/C-
system, its functionality and its domain. For example in the 
domain of embedded systems the functionality along with 
hardware and software are closely related even during the 
development. This is the nature of embedded systems. For 
them one would expect optional system-of-system level in 
the higher levels of the hierarchical design, one or more lev-
els where the sub systems are handled and finally a level 
where electronic control units (ECU) are defined and de-
tailed into the technology level using hardware, software 
and (some of the ECUs) AI.  
AI Development 
Activities of the Technology Level are focused on con-
tributing to the solution, based on a certain type of technol-
ogy. The design of components based on SW or HW is con-
sidered separately within existing standards, due to the dif-
ferent concerns that these technologies raise. This work ar-
gues that unique characteristics of AI technology predestine 
it for having separate place within the overall lifecycle. This 
implies establishment of AI Development phase. 
Design and implementation of AI-based solution resem-
bles to some extent design and implementation as done with 
standards SW approach. Simply, most of the ML (machine 
learning) algorithms is implemented in SW and therefore AI 
gained perception similar to SW. Nevertheless, AI could 
definitely be perceived as additional abstraction on top of 
the SW. It could be compared to model driven development 
(which ultimately also relies on SW), but it comes along 
with the new philosophy for design and implementation, dif-
ferent kind of tooling, and hence different requirement in 
terms of knowledge, useful to work with these technologies. 
For MDD this means development of models out of which 
code is being generated and then compiled. New abstraction 
definitely brings new challenges but also opportunities. The 
latter in terms of AI this is mainly possibility to implement 
features operating in open context (e.g. autonomous driv-
ing). This however imposes challenges, which are not char-
acteristic to pure SW development. For example, proper AI 
algorithm needs to be selected. This step could be compared 
to justified selection of programming language, which shall 
serve best the implementation of intended functionality, re-
specting for instance non-functional concerns such as exe-
cution time. Next, if neural networks are used, their design 
(e.g. choice of the number of layers) could be referred to SW 
architecture design. However, both solve different problems 
and definitely require different set of skills. Another, signif-
icant difference refers to ultimate implementation. Namely, 
in SW this boils down to the coding of atomic SW units 
specified as part of the SW architecture. For NN, this is 
learning process. How SW units are implemented depends 
on the requirements which are attached to them. On the other 
hand, there is no explicit requirements specification for NN. 
Requirements are implicitly embodied by the collected data, 
used for the learning process, and this data ultimately im-
pacts the NN implementation. This is definitely a relevant 
difference between SW and AI, one that has also huge im-
plications on how trustworthiness is considered. Having 
standard requirements which then could be attached to SW 
units, enables proper traceability. This is not possible for 
NN. In conclusion, AI reveals new challenges when com-
pared to SW, both from the design but also trustworthiness 
perspective. This drives the idea of treating its design as a 
separate concern within the overall framework. 
There are several objectives of AI Development. The first 
and most important is the selection of AI technology which 
is believed to provide the best solution for the required func-
tionality. This decision has a relevant impact on the follow-
ing activities. One of them is a choice of an appropriate AI 
Blueprint (see following section) and then its adaptation 
(tuning) and application so that it can be effectively used 
with the selected AI technology. Having these precondi-
tions, ultimate objective, i.e. delivery of the AI element to-
gether with all necessary documentation and qualifications 
to the system integration and verification can be fulfilled. 
Inputs to AI Development phase these are functional and 
non-functional requirements allocated to the element, and 
trustworthiness attributes. The first drive the design of a so-
lution. The second has substantial impact on the reasoning 
about the trustworthiness qualification of the designed AI 
component. 
AI Blueprint 
The development or training of AI components does not 
fit into existing process models (e.g. like for classical soft-
ware) due to the specific nature of the AI methodologies. 
Even inside the field of AI, different methodologies and so-
lution concepts can have very specific requirements towards 
the underlying process model. For example, a deep convo-
lutional neural network for supervised learning has almost 
nothing in common with STRIPS planning, a purely sym-
bolic automated planning approach. This urges for the new 
approach in which specific characteristics of certain AI tech-
nology are targeted by design process. In consequence, the 
framework introduces concept of AI blueprint and the need 
of defining specific blueprint, depending on the type of AI 
technology being used. This means that standard should be 
flexible enough to enable incorporation of blueprints which 
use specific methods or narrow set of methods. 
The blueprint can be interpreted as a kind of template pro-
cess that can be applied to the relevant kind of AI method-
ology. It is characterized by Input and Output Interfaces, 
Structure (i.e. design phases) and Qualifications. The execu-
tion of AI blueprint provides an AI element characterized by 
a predefined quality level, including guarantee to meet de-
fined dependability requirements. 
In order for the blueprints itself to be incorporable within 
the overall design lifecycle, there exist two different forms 
of requirements imposed on them. The first one is the tech-
nical requirement, that all blueprints possess required inter-
faces, in order to plug them into the development lifecycle. 
This means that they process the properties and artifacts that 
are handed down to them, as well as that they deliver the 
required results back to the higher levels.  
As inputs of the AI development the requirements and 
trustworthiness requirements with additional attribute like 
TPL are provided by the system level, and as output of the 
AI development the system level expects the AI element 
along with the confidence level AI, which conceptually is 
similar to  for HW (from ISO 26262), but requires different 
approach to calculate it. 
Figure 5 presents an example of an AI Blueprint dedicated 
to develop AI Element, using NNs and supervised learning. 
In this case, similarly as it is advocated in ISO 26262 for SW 
or HW design, this AI Blueprint is based on the V-model. 
The last of course is not the required property of AI Blue-
print. It adheres to the above requirements, i.e. it accepts two 
input elements, i.e. trustworthiness requirements and TPLs. 
Similarly, an output of this AI Blueprint delivers AI element 
together with confidence level AI. 
Summary and Future Work 
This work described trustworthiness reference lifecycle. 
The main contribution of this work in regards to existing ap-
proaches or standards lies in the overall structure of the 
trustworthiness lifecycle. These are especially: 
• addition of one level above the engineering of the system 
of interest, i.e. solution level 
• enablement of approaches based on integrity and assur-
ance 
• introduction of “AI” as a 3rd kind besides software and 
hardware, resulting in the concepts of AI Development 
and AI Blueprint. 
There are several parts of the overall framework which 
still require deeper consideration and explanation. These 
will be considered in the following series of papers. This is 
more exhaustive specification of the AI Blueprint concept, 
where the most important is introduction and deeper discus-
sion of examples of blueprints that could be used. In parallel, 
deep discussion over the definition of the confidence param-
eter will be presented. The last will allow to reason about 
the trustworthiness qualifications of the AI design. This is 
so called AI concept, briefly introduced in this paper. 
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Figure 5: AI Blueprint for Supervised Learning of NNs 
